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A symposium on the idea of “concepts” is a tricky matter.
For one thing, the relevant issues have a way of persistently
reflecting back on themselves. And when they do, the task
becomes a knottier one of trying to conceptualize what it means
to conceptualize, which hurls us headlong into debates about
theory and practice and the endless loops associated with
those. The usual editorial challenges of characterizing a plural-
ity of perspectives are thus compounded in this case. The
initial condition of recognizing the contestedness of concep-
tual meanings, for instance, must be that participants in a de-
bate about it speak in their own diverse terms, traditions, aims,
and demands, where possibly a plurality of conversations en-
sues. The job is made all the more thorny by the fact that what
an adequate description of the terrain of debates about con-
cepts should look like is itself an open question, depending on
the various purposes one could invoke for thinking about them.
But I leave these admittedly not-so-trivial issues aside
for the moment to hit on the equally significant points of
convergence among the views presented here. For what these
authors are doing as a group is drawing our attention to the
often neglected set of considerations about how we should
understand concepts even before we try to do the various
things we could do with them. And there is good reason to
commend this general stance, regardless of where one stands
on some of the particulars, because so much of what passes
for scholarship in political science today proceeds without a
trace of due attention to issues like the scope and boundaries
of concepts (cf. Choi, Freeden), the real world contestation
over meanings and usage (cf. Davis), and legitimate versus
illegitimate conceptual applications (cf. Bevir). It is not an
exaggeration to say that most of the research emanating from
the scholarly mills today evinces little or no concern for these
at all. Dominating our top journals are arguments of the ilk
that try to demonstrate the impact of x on y with a narrow
explication of the statistical significance thereof, e.g. articles
that identify the particular causes of institutional change, voter
turnout, or the impact of GDP on democratic consolidation, or
the possibilities for a “democratic peace,” to name a few.
The overwhelming emphasis of the discipline is squarely
on attempts to model regularities in the social world, typically
by isolating variables and demonstrating their seeming causal
affectabilities against each other. Whatever one’s view about
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this, closer attention ought to be paid to the ways that con-
cepts actually operate, for example, to the functions they serve
in academic research versus real world politics (cf., Freeden,
Davis). Doing so could lead us to insights that advance our
pursuit of knowledge and may even elevate the character of
the discipline as a whole. To be sure, it would alter not only the
kinds of research outcomes we get but also the process of
inquiry itself (cf., Choi, Bevir). If these authors are right, then
paying closer attention to concepts would heighten our aware-
ness of the interaction and inter-relations between variables,
in addition to merely their discreet causal effects. It may help
us to resolve some messy operationalization issues for par-
ticular concepts, or at least motivate us to come up with ad-
equate ways of explaining processes, events, actions, or speech
that are by nature essentially contested and irreducibly con-
testable.
To begin, Freeden makes a concerted effort to draw spe-
cific parameters around concepts that are characteristically
political in nature, even while simultaneously showing us the
impossibility of establishing boundaries that are static, or in
any way pre-determined in their content. Part of the difficulty
lies in what he lays out as the fundamentally evaluative na-
ture of political concepts. He offers a taxonomical analysis of
the relative normative weights that political concepts carry in
practice–at the intersecting levels of significance, legitimacy,
and intensity–that set political concepts apart from any other
run-of-the-mill concept. In studying politics, therefore, we have
reason to be alert to the structural aspects of concepts that do
not readily meet the eye but nonetheless operate in multiple
and dynamic ways–by discursive, illocutionary, or even sub-
versive means.
Choi is much less comfortable with the notion of the “po-
litical” as a separate or privileged category of concepts. Rather,
she argues that all human action and social practices, includ-
ing political science (itself a social practice not unlike those
we seek to gain knowledge about), are each imbued with what-
ever meanings its practitioners attach to their concepts, and
are therefore coextensive with the theories, purposes, and
beliefs of its participants. What she argues is required for
explanation-giving is a “family resemblances approach” to
concepts that makes possible hermeneutical accounts that
elucidate the particular concepts through which the mean-
ings of agents operate. She contends that while concepts
essentially constitute social practices, they are vague, by na-
ture, because of the variable ways that people can construe
meanings. Thus the vagueness of concepts is something we
as political scientists should try to get more comfortable with
and not try to skirt or pretend away; certainly not by various
means of conceptual abstraction and reification, or mechani-
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racy,” “peace,” and “war,” simply precludes their useful, not
to mention reliable, operationalization. He writes, “rather than
producing increased inter-coder reliability, efforts to increase
operational precision have generated new lines of conten-
tion.”
Thus, depending on the perspective of the reader, what
follows in these pages can appear to require some massive
changes in the discipline. Perhaps more than many of us could
comfortably admit. (How hard, after all, are we willing to bite
the hand that feeds us?) On the other hand, the explication of
what supports the political-science-as-usual model can be quite
consistent with a more conservative view of our scholarly prac-
tices. Either way, paying due attention to the inherently
decentered nature of the concepts we study can only move us
toward garnering greater relevance in the world at large than
presently seems to be the case.
There is one area that political theory has barely begun to
probe: what makes political thought political?1 Not ethical,
not philosophical, not historical, but political. What kind of
everyday thinking is entitled to be called political thinking,
and how should we, as scholars, try and make sense of such
thinking? I take the political concept as the basic unit of politi-
cal thinking—and by “concept” I mean a unit of meaning and
of understanding that is incorporated in a unit of language, a
signifier. The meeting of “concept” and of “politics” creates
two dynamics in opposite directions. The first dynamic in-
fuses thinking with the inescapable characteristics of concepts
in general. Concepts are ambiguous, indeterminate, vague, and
inconclusive. Ipso facto, political thought will necessarily dis-
play those components as well, and I have dealt with that
question recently.2 The second, addressed here, identifies cen-
tral features of the political, and then explores the manner in
which language—as thought, text, speech, and non-verbal ex-
pression—discharges those features, and the manner in which
concepts carry specifically political import. They do so in two
ways: either through special attributes that are plainly politi-
cal, or through the substantive issues they address. Because
human interaction and thought always have a political dimen-
sion, whether significant or trivial, some fundamental features
of political concepts are universal in a macro sense, while at
the same time having particular manifestations at different times
and places.
Thinking about Politics
What makes thinking political is its effective engagement
in one or more of the following, in no particular order. It ranks
aims, processes, and structures in order of importance; it ac-
cepts and justifies political entities and procedures; it works
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cal explanations of processes that bypass the agents’ con-
cepts altogether.
Davis points to several examples and domains in which
the aim of clarifying concepts that have inherently fuzzy bor-
ders shows itself to be self-defeating. The dilemma lies in the
conflict between the twin social-scientific virtues of analytic
differentiation and conceptual validity, and the inability of even
the most conscientious methodologist to capture the perva-
sive variation in the realm of empirical observation. His exem-
plary case is the concept of democracy and the controversies
surrounding efforts to construct valid data-sets–evinced by
the proliferation of sub-types and “diminished subtypes”–
which he argues provides further evidence for his contention
that much of the social construction of meaning takes place at
the boundaries of our concepts rather than their cores.
Bevir takes up the particular issue of “anachronism”
through which he shows how we can legitimately treat our
concepts as valid for other times and places. He offers a philo-
sophical argument for the universal applicability of certain
concepts we hold, such as “action” and “procedural individu-
alism.” The grammar of our concepts implies that such con-
cepts apply across the board, in that by deploying our con-
cept of action, for instance, we are committed to the concept of
intentionality that it entails, despite the wide-ranging histori-
cal or cultural dissimilarities we would want to recognize in the
content of such concepts. He argues that the grammar of our
concept of “meaning” also commits us to a procedural indi-
vidualism that precludes us from postulating meanings that
we can not attribute, at least in principle, to certain people.
These concepts are sufficiently abstract and capture general
human faculties or capacities, but they do not prescribe spe-
cific content to those faculties or capacities. Thus he argues
that the danger of anachronism arises only when we attempt to
re-enact past beliefs, ideas, or intentions in a way that ascribes
to people particular beliefs or intentions that they could not
have held.
So where’s the pay-off in heeding any of this? What we
have here, after all, is a methods symposium. So what qualita-
tative techniques in particular, if any, can be offered to help
sort through the questions raised by these articles? Most of
the authors do intimate, and in some places quite explicitly
recommend, some practical measures that are entailed by the
view of concepts the author is expounding. Readers will not,
however, step away from here with the sense that what is
being offered is a research program, a blueprint for explana-
tion-giving, or a full epistemological theory that would have
to underpin such ends. Indeed, the upshot of some of these
arguments, though by no means all of them, is that methodol-
ogy as a separate rarified scholarly activity may be superflu-
ous. For Choi, the unease that this might bring can be dif-
fused by doing away with the need for codifying techniques
for proceeding into inquiry in the first place. She writes, “if the
concepts embodied in our research techniques cannot rea-
sonably be expected to be those of the participants of the
practice we are studying, then they cannot rightly be used to
explain them.” For Davis, the fuzziness of some of our most
cherished and staple social scientific concepts, like “democ-
